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Constitutional Law-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-CRIMINAL
CONTEMPT-THERIGHTTO TRIALBY JURY-Muniz U. Hoffman, 422
U.S. 454 (1975).
Early in 1970, Local 21 of the San Francisco Typographical
Union began picketing the publishing plant of a local newspaper.
The newspaper responded by filing an unfair labor practice
charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).' Pursuant to section lO(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, the
regional director of the NLRB secured a temporary injunction
prohibiting continued picketing while the NLRB7sdecision was
pending. Local 70 and its president, Muniz, were subsequently
charged with both civil and criminal contempt for joining Local
21 in its activities prohibited by the injunction. The district court
denied the defendants' request for a jury trial, placed Muniz on
probation for 1 year and fined Local 70 $10,000. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.2
On writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
Muniz and Local 70 argued that the district court's decision unconstitutionally deprived them of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by article 11, section 2(3)3 and the Sixth Amendment.4
Petitioners pointed out that 18 U.S.C. section l(3) implies that
, ~ since the
offenses punished by a fine over $500 are s e r i ~ u sand
right to trial by jury attaches whenever the crime is serious, the
petitioners claimed they were entitled to a jury? Petitioners also
claimed a statutory right to trial by jury under 18 U.S.C. section
3692, which provides for a jury "in any case involving or growing
out of a labor dispute."'
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Supreme Court
1. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 9 160(1) (1970).
2. Hoffman v. Teamsters Local 70, 492 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1974).
3. U.S. CONST.art. 111, § 2(3) provides, in pertinent part: "The Trial of all Crimes,
except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . . ."
4. U S . CONST.amend. VI provides, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . ."
5. 18 U.S.C. 4 l(3) (1970) reads as follows: "Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which
does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500,
or both, is a petty offense."
6. Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 476 (1975).
7. 18 U.S.C. 6 3692 (1970) reads, in pertinent part:
In all cases of contempt arising under the laws of the United States goveming the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders in any case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the contempt
shall have been committed.
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held that despite the broad language of section 3692, the legislative history indicated that the intended scope of the statute was
limited to cases arising under the Norris-LaGuardia Act? The
Court also concluded that where the punishment imposed for
criminal contempt is limited to a fine, the definition of petty and
serious offenses contained in section l(3) does not control the
constitutional right to trial by jury.g Other than a brief description of the Court's treatment of the first issue, this case note will
consider only the latter aspect of the Court's decision and its
effect on the yet unresolved conflict between the judiciary's summary contempt powers and the defendant's right to trial by jury.

A.

The Right to Trial by Jury

Trial by jury originated in the English'common law where it
was considered a matter of right in both civil and criminal proceedings? This right, however, was restricted to cases involving
"serious" offenses; so called "petty" offenses were summarilyii
punished.I2 These English practices became part of the common
8. 29 U.S.C. $$ 101-15 (1970).
9. 422 U.S. 454, 476-77 (1975).
10. In the 18th century, Blackstone wrote of the English jury trial practice:
Our law has, therefore, wisely placed this strong and two-fold barrier, of a
presentment and a trial by jury, between the liberties of the people and the
prerogative of the crown. It was necessary, for preserving the admirable balance
of our constitution, to vest the executive power of the laws in the prince; and
yet this power might be dangerous and destructive to that very constitution, if
exerted without check or control, by justices of oyer and terminer occasionally
named by the crown; who might then, as in France or Turkey, imprison, dispatch, or exile any man that was obnoxious to the government, by an instant
declaration that such is their will and pleasure. But the founders of the English
law have, with excellent forecast, contrived that . . . the truth of every accusation, whether preferred in the shape of indictment, information, or appeal,
should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his
equals and neighbors indifferently chosen and superior to all suspicion.
COMMENTARIES
349-50 (Wendell ed. 1854).
4 W. BLACKSTON,
11. "The term used in connection with legal proceedings means a short, concise, and
immediate proceeding . . . and trial of a 'summary' character is a trial without a jury."
BLACK'S
LAWDICTIONARY1604 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
12. This fact was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v.
Clawans, 300 U S . 617, 624 (1937):
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution there were numerous offenses,
commonly described as "petty," which were tried summarily without a jury, by
justices of the peace in England, and by police magistrates or corresponding
judicial officers in the Colonies, and punished by commitment to jail, a workhouse, or a house of correction.
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law of the American Colonies13 and subsequently were incorporated in the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights.14
Article 111, section 2(3) of the Constitution and the Sixth Amendment provide for a jury in the trial of all crimes;15 the Seventh
Amendment extends this right to all "suits a t common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars."16 In light
of this common law background, it was long held that the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury extended no further than the
guarantee under the common law of 1789.'' More recent constitutional interpretations, however, have expanded the common law
definition of "serious" crimes to include all criminal offenses
where the defendant may be incarcerated for over 6 months.lThe
Contra, Comment, Aggregating Multiple Contempts of Court: The Supreme Court Takes
Another Step to Insure a Jury Trial, 20 S.D.L. REV.438 (1975). The author suggests that
England utilized summary proceedings for direct criminal contempts but juries for indirect criminal contempts. Another commentator claims that "until 1720 there is no instance in the common-law precedents of punishment otherwise than after trial in the
ordinary course and not by summary process.'' Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress
Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "lnferior" Federal Courts-A Study in SeparaL. REV.1010, 1046 (1924).
tion of Powers, 37 HARV.
13. See United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 701-24 (1964) (considering the contempt proceedings of each colony).
14. Incorporation was implied by the Court. This position, however, has had its
critics both on and off the bench. See notes 88-99 and accompanying text infra; note 12
supra.
15. See notes 3, 4 supra.
16. I1.S. CONST.amend. VII.
17. The purpose of art. 111, $ 2 was to
preserve unimpaired trial by jury in all those cases in which it had been recognized by the common law and in all cases of a like nature as they might arise
in the future . . . but not to bring within the sweep of the guaranty those cases
in which it was then well understood that a jury trial could not be demanded
as a right.
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942). This position is also supported by Gompers v.
United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914), wherein the Court said:
But the provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having
their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted from
English soil. Their significance is vital not formal; it is to be gathered not simply
by taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the
line of their growth. It does not follow that contempts of the class under consideration are not crimes, or rather, in the language of the statute, offenses, because
trial by jury as it has been gradually worked out and fought out has been thought
not to extend to them as a matter of constitutional right.
18. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg,
384 U.S. 373 (1966). In Cheff, the Court said:
[IJn the exercise of the Court's supervisory power and under the peculiar power
of the federal courts to revise sentences in contempt cases, we rule further than
sentences exceeding six months for criminal contempt may not be imposed by
federal courts absent a jury trial or a waiver thereof.
Id. at 380.
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right to trial by jury has also been extended to civil cases involving mixed questions of law and equity.'"

B. Contempt Proceedings
Contempt of court can be defined as any act or omission that
disrupts or obstructs the judicial process.20An act of contempt
can be classified as either civil-initiated by a private party, or
criminal-initiated by the court,21and as direct or indirect, depending on whether it occurred within or without the courtroom.22
At common law, the power to summarily punish for contempt was deemed an inherent and necessary power of courts to
preserve the orderly administration of justice.23 This summary
power was preserved in the federal judicial system as created by
the Judiciary Act of 1789.24Unrestrained by the buffering influence of a jury, however, the broad language of the act soon led to
abuses. A notorious example of such abuse was Judge Peck's
summary imposition of criminal contempt sanctions on a disinterested third party for out of court criticism of his decision in a
case pending on appeal. This abuse led to congressional impeachment proceedings against Judge Peck."
The day following the Peck proceedings, Congress began
19. E.g., Beacon Theatres; Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1958).
L. REV.183, 185-86 (1971).
20. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL
21. Keller, Civil and Criminal Contempt, 43 N.D.L. REV.244,244-45 (1967) (examining the procedural and substantive differences between civil and criminal contempt).
It has sometimes been said that a person incarcerated for civil contempt carries the
keys to the jail since he will be released upon compliance with the relevant court orders.
United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 754 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
The Ninth Circuit defined criminal contempt as conduct against the authority and
dignity of the court, an act which requires the "vindication of the court's authority and
the punishment of a public wrong." In re Osborne, 344 F.2d 611, 616 (9th Cir. 1965).
22. Direct contempt is contumacious behavior that transpires under the court's own
eye and within its hearing. Exparte Terry, 128 U.S. 289,308-09 (1888). "Indirect contempt
is contumacious behavior occurring beyond the eye or hearing of the court and for knowledge of which the court must depend upon the testimony of third parties or the confession
of the contemnor." United States v. Marshall, 451 F.2d 372, 373 (9th Cir. 1971).
23. See Robertson v. State, 20 Ala. App. 514, 104 So. 561, 565 (1924). In 1859, the
Supreme Court of Mississippi declared that:
A court without the power effectually to protect itself against the assaults of the
lawless, or to enforce its orders, judgments, or decrees against the recusant
parties before it, would be a disgrace to the legislation, and a stigma upon the
age which invented it.
Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 331, 341 (1858).
24. Ch. 20, 9 17, 1 Stat. 83.
25. For a full transcript of the proceedings before the House and the Senate see A.
STANSBURY.
REPORT
OF THE TRIAL
OF JAMES
H. PECK(1833). A brief account is found in Nye
v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 45 (1941).
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work on the Judiciary Act of March 2, 1831. This legislation limited the federal courts' summary contempt powers to acts occurring within the courtroom (direct contempts), but the right to
trial by jury was not extended to any contempt proceeding^.^^
Since the lower federal courts derive their existence and jurisdiction from congressional action,27there is no doubt that Congress
retained the authority to restrict what some have argued is the
"inherent" authority of the federal courts to deal with acts of
contempt .28

C. T h e Right to Trial by Jury i n Criminal Contempt Proceeding
Since a t common law neither criminal nor civil contempt was
considered a crime, much less a serious crime, the right to trial
by jury was not applicable. Largely as a result of continuing judicial abuseZgand congressional inaction, the Supreme Court in
1964 began to impose additional restraints on the judiciary's exer26. Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, § 1, 4 Stat. 487. The Act prohibited summary
proceedings for contempt except where such contempt occurred in the presence of the
court or near enough to obstruct justice. The present statute, 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970),
enacted in 1948, incorporates the provisions of the 1831 act and limits the power of
summary punishment to three situations: (1) misbehavior of any person in the court's
presence or so near as to obstruct justice; (2) misbehavior of any of the court's officers
in their official capacity; and (3) disobedience or resistance to the court's lawful writ,
process or order.
27. Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the federal courts "shall have power . . . to
punish by fine or imprisonment, a t the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority
in any cause or hearing before the same . . . ."
The Supreme Court said in Ex parte Robinson, 86 U S . (19 Wall.) 505, 511 (1873)
that:
These courts [district and circuit] were created by act of Congress. Their powers and duties depend upon the act calling them into existence, or subsequent
acts extending or limiting their jurisdiction. The Act of 1831 [now 18 U.S.C. § ,
401 (1970)j is, therefore, to them the law specifying the cases in which summary
punishment for contempts may be inflicted.
28. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510-11 (1873). See generally J. Fox,
OF CONTEMPT
OF COURT
(1927).
THEHISTORY
29. The Court has recognized the unique potential for judicial abuse in summarily
punishing criminal contempts. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974); Offutt v.
United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925); Ex parte
Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888). In Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), the Court stated:
[A] compelling argument can be made for providing a right to jury trial as a
protection against the arbitrary exercise of official power. Contemptuous
conduct, though a public wrong, often strikes at the most vulnerable and human
qualities of a judge's temperament. . . .

....
. . . [Tlhere has been a recurring necessity to set aside punishments for
criminal contempt as either unauthorized by statute or too harsh.
Id. a t 202, 206.
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cise of contempt powers. In United States u. B ~ r n e t tthe
, ~ ~Court
refused to declare criminal contempt to be a crime. Therefore,
whether or not the contempt itself was serious, there was no right
to trial by jury?' The Court added, however, that if the punishment for the contempt were sufficiently serious there might be a
right to trial by
TWO years later, in Cheff v.
S c h n a ~ k e n b e r gthe
, ~ ~ Court was asked to indicate what punishment was sufficiently serious to trigger this right. Although not
formally adopting 18 U. S.C. section l(3) (defining petty offenses)
as the standard, the Court referred to it and held that sentences
for criminal contempt exceeding 6 months imprisonment "may
not be imposed by federal courts absent a jury trial or waiver
thereof. "34 Interestingly, the Court used a standard based on the
difference between serious and petty crimes even though it had
not yet declared criminal contempt to be a crime. This discrepancy was resolved in Bloom u. Illinois35when the Court declared
criminal contempt to be a "crime in every fundamental res p e ~ t , " ~ ~ hmeriting
us
a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment
when the contempt is serious.37Without expressly referring to
section 1(3), the Court held that in the absence of a jury or a
waiver thereof, it is unconstitutional to impose a sentence of 2
years imprisonment in an indirect criminal contempt proceed,~~
the same day as Bloom,
ing? In .Duncan v. L o ~ i s i a n a decided
the Court used the standard established by section l(3) to determine whether a crime was serious, thereby entitling the defendant to a trial by jury. Again, however, the Court refused to
expressly adopt the statute's standard.'O Finally, in Codispoti v.
P e n n ~ y l v a n i a ,the
~ ~ Court, without actually mentioning section
1(3), adopted its 6 months imprisonment standard in criminal
contempt proceedings arising in state courts.
30. 376 U.S. 681 (1964).
31. Fifty cases from 1812 to 1964 are cited in support of summary disposition of
contempts without reference to any distiction based on the seriousness of the offense. Id.
at 694 & n.12.
32. Id. at 695 n.12.
33. 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
34. Id. at 380.
35. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
36. Id. at 201.
37. Id. at 202.
38. Although the case dealt with indirect contempt, in dicta the Court suggested that
the right to a jury trial might extend to direct contempts as well. Id. at 209-10.
39. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
40. Id. at 161.
41. 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974).
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In its search for a standard to determine when the right to
trial by jury attaches in both criminal and criminal contempt
proceedings, the Court has often referred to section 1(3), but has
never expressly adopted i t as the standard. Furthermore, the
Court has never addressed the question of how large a fine must
be to trigger the right to a jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings. Therefore, it is not surprising that when faced with requests
for a jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings, lower court
decisions have varied greatly. Some courts have relied on the
standard of section l(3) and have held that a criminal contempt
punished by a fine over $500 was serious, requiring a trial by
Other courts have refused to follow the statute, reasoning
that the Supreme Court has not discussed fines and that they
were therefore free to make their own determination of the seriousness of the contempt.43Thus, when the Court considered
Muniz, the only point of agreement among the courts was that
trial by jury was required where the contemnor was sentenced to
more than 6 months incarceration.

In Muniz u. Hoffman, the Court confronted the same question that has divided the lower courts. That is, how large must a
fine for criminal contempt be for the offense to be considered
serious with the attendant right to a trial by jury? As a corollary
to that issue, Muniz also presented the question of whether section l(3) should control the classification of criminal contempts
as petty or serious.
Before reaching these issues, the Court considered the petitioners' claim to a statutory right to trial by jury under 18 U.S.C.
section 3692.j4Despite its broad language guaranteeing the right
to trial by jury "in any case involving or growing out of a labor
dispute," the Court noted that the statute was intended to be a
42. E.g.,Mitchell v. Fiore, 470 F.2d 1149, 1153 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. R.L.
Polk & Co., 438 F.2d 377 (6th Cir. 1971); County of McClean v. Kickapoo Creek, Inc., 51
111. 2d 353, 282 N.E.2d 720 (1972). See also United States v. Merrick, 459 F.2d 644 (4th
Cir. 1972) (18 U.S.C. Ej l(3) quoted as the legislative definition of the maximum penalty
that may be considered petty); Blue Jeans Corp. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America, 275 N.C. 503, 169 S.E.2d 867 (1969) (referring to the threshold established by
18 U.S.C. 0 l(3)).
43. E.g, Clark v. Boyton, 362 F.2d 992, 999 & n.17 (5th Cir. 1966); Seven Rivers
Farm, Inc. v. Reynolds, 84 N.M. 789, 508 P.2d 1276 (1973); In re Jersey City Educ. Ass'n,
115 N.J. Super. 42, 278 A.2d 206 (Super. Ct. 1971); Rankin v. Shanker, 23 N.Y.2d 111,
242 N.E.2d 802, 295 N.Y .S .2d 625 (1968).
44. The pertinent part of Ej 3692 is quoted a t note 7 supra.
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mere recodification of section 11 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act?
Since Muniz arose under the Taft-Hartley Actd6and was not covered by the Norris-LaGuardia jury trial provisions, the Court
concluded that section 3692 did not apply." Justices Stewart,
Marshall, Powell, and Douglas dissented on the ground that the
plain meaning of section 3692 should govern its interpretation,
not prior interpretations of section 11 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act .dn
The Court then considered the union's second claim,'g that
the imposition of a $10,000 fine rendered the contempt a serious
offense under the standard of section l(3) and that, consequently,
its demand for a trial by jury under article 111, section 2 and the
Sixth Amendment had been erroneously denied. This claim presented the Court with an issue of first impression; that is, whether
a right to trial by jury exists when a criminal contempt is pune
ished by a fine unaccompanied by i n ~ a r c e r a t i o n . ~ T hmajority
rejected the proposition that all criminal contempts are serious
per se. Rather, it concluded that in light of the fundamental
differences between fines and imprisonment, the seriousness of a
contempt in which a fine alone was imposed must be evaluated
on a case by case basis. Futhermore, the standard of section l(3)
was held not to control the petty/serious determination required
Having rejected
by the common law gloss on the Con~titution.~'
this standard, however, the Court failed to provide another objective standard upon which to base the petty/serious determination. Rather, noting that the union collected dues from 13,000
members, the Court held that "the fine of $10,000 imposed on
Local 70 in this case was [not] a deprivation of such magnitude
that a jury should have been interposed to guard against bias or
mistake.''52
45. 422 U.S. 454, 462-63, 467-69 (1975).
46. 29 U.S.C. $ 4 141-97 (1970).
47. 422 U.S. at 467, 474 (1975).
48. Id. a t 478 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 484 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
49. Muniz did not join with the union in asserting this claim because he was merely
placed on probation for 1 year. In Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969), the
Supreme Court rejected the claim that a sentence of 3 years probation was serious and
therefore merited a trial by jury. Referring to the statute defining petty and serious
offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 1(3), the Court pointed out that the statute only mentions penal
sanctions and monetary fines, making no reference to probationary penalties. Since the
Court refused to grant a jury trial on the basis of the 3-year probationary penalty in Frank,
silence on this matter in Muniz is understandable. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454,
476 (1975); 69 MICH.L.REV.1549, 1562-63 (1971).
50. 422 U.S. a t 476.
51. See id. at 476-77.
52. Id. a t 477.
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Justice Douglas argued in dissent that the plain meaning of
the Sixth Amendment requires a jury trial upon demand in all
criminal proceedings.13 He further argued that even assuming
that the petty/serious dichotomy was appropriately applied in
Muniz," "it is impossible fairly to characterize either the offense
or its penalty as 'petty.' "5J

A.

Consequences of Muniz

The Court's refusal to adopt the objective standard of section
l(3) in applying the petty/serious standard of the Sixth Amendment creates more confusion in an already uncertain area of the
law. By the time Muniz reached the Supreme Court, it was clear
that the seriousness of criminal contempts, now deemed crimes
by virtue of Bloom, was to be measured by the penalty actually
imposed." I t was not clear, however, what standard would be
used to distinguish between petty and serious criminal contemptseJ7
In the past, the Court understandably has been influenced
by section l(3) since that section seemed well suited as a standard
for classifying petty and serious crimes. Unfortunately, the Court
has used this statute inconsistently. At times, it has referred to
and relied on the statute without expressly adopting its terms;
other times, the Court has ignored the statute.58For example, in
Duncan the Court referred to section l(3) and relied on its standardJ%ut refused to specifically adopt it, stating, "we need not,
53. Id. at 479-80. In an earlier case Justice Douglas expressed a similar view. Noting
that Congress has not attempted to isolate petty contempts, he contended that it is
improper for the Court to do so. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373,392 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
54. Justice Douglas has argued that the Court should not apply a pettylserious test
in the absence of legislation isolating petty from serious criminal contempts. See Cheff v.
Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 393 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
55. 422 U.S. at 480.
56. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201, 211 (1968).
57. See notes 42, 43 and accompanying text supra.
58. Compare Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969) and Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968) with Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) and Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
59. The Court's language, however, encompasses more than the standard of 18 U.S.C.
4 l(3):
In determining whether the length of the authorized prison term or the
seriousness of other punishment is enough in itself to receive a jury trial, we are
counseled by District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, to refer to objective
criteria, chiefly the existing laws and practices in the Nation. In the federal
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however, settle in this case the exact location of the line between
petty offenses and crimes."" Yet the opinion in Bloom u. Illinois,
written by the same author as Duncan, failed even to refer to the
statute? Finally, in Muniz, the Court refused to rely on the statuteee2
The Court's rejection of the objective standard of section l(3)
is understandable given the legislative history of the statute.
Early versions and congressional records suggest that the statute
was intended to unclog criminal calendars by eliminating the
need for a grand jury indictment for petty offenses." Furthermore, the House proceedings reveal no expectation t h a t the
petty/serious standard established therein would control the right
to trial by
This history, together with the fact that section
l(3) existed in one form or another for over 35 yearss5without even
being referred to as a factor in determining the right to a jury trial
in criminal contempt or criminal
makes it clear that Congress never intended it to be used for this purpose.67
Rejection of the statute has two important consequences.
First, the rejection demonstrates that the Court's characterization of an offense as serious if the punishment exceeds 6 months
incarceration is the result of judicial alteration of the common
law? Second, when only a fine is imposed for contempt, there is
no objective standard for determining whether the offense is petty
or serious. This leaves the constitutional right of trial by jury to
the discretion of judges subject only to appellate court review.
Each case will require unique analysis of its facts and merits.69
system, petty offenses are defined as those punishable by no more than six
months imprisonment and a $500 fine.
391 U.S. a t 161.This statement suggests that societal attitudes toward criminal contempt
may influence judicial assessment of seriousness. Although the Court stated that legislative enactments especially reflect societal attitudes, other expressions of public sentiment
might similarly influence the judges. See also Note, Criminal Contempt and Trial by Jury,
8 WM. & MARY
L.REV.76, 90-100(1966).
60. 391 U.S. a t 161.
61. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
62. 422 U.S. 454 (1975).
63. See Act of Dec. 16, 1930,ch. 15,46 Stat. 1029-30;72 CONG.REC.9991-94(1930).
64. See 72 CONG.REC.9991-94(1930).
65. See note 63 supra.
66. It was first used for this purpose in Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
67. The $500 maximum provision of 18 U.S.C. 8 l(3) has remained unaltered in the
course of subsequent recodifications. Failure to adjust the amount in light of inflation
casts further doubt on the theory that the statute was intended to categorize crimes as
petty or serious with jury trial consequences.
68. See notes 12, 17 supra.
69. One might ordinarily think that only criminal contempt cases involving fines over
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Indeed, until the Supreme Court reviews a case, the trial judge
will not know with certainty whether he should have impaneled
a jury.

B. Evidence of the Contemnor's Financial Status i n
Determining His Right to a Jury Trial
1. In general
Although the Court is unwilling to apply the precise provisions of the statute, it considers the actual penalty imposed to be
important in assessing the seriousness of the criminal contempt.70
In Muniz, the Court considered not only the size of the fine
actually imposed, but also the union's ability to pay the fine."
Consideration of this factor is unusual. In the civil setting, evidence of a defendant's financial condition is generally considered
irrelevant72and unfairly p r e j ~ d i c i a lexcept
, ~ ~ on the issue of punitive damage~.~"irnilarly, except for its potential use in sentencing,75the question of a defendant's wealth would rarely arise in a
criminal trial.?"ts use in a criminal contempt proceeding, while
analogous to the punitive damages context and punitive phase of
a criminal trial, is not wholly the same. But since fines for criminal contempt, like punitive damages and criminal punishment,
are arguably aimed at deterrence, it seems appropriate to consider financial condition.77
The issue in Muniz, however, was not the size of the fine
necessary to insure sufficient deterrence, but the size of the fine
that would warrant a jury
When the deterrence considera$500 would require review regarding seriousness. This may not be so, however, since in
certain circumstances even a fine under $500 may be held to be serious. Another unanswered question is how the Court will look on imprisonment terms under 6 months accompanied by fines of varying sizes.
70. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968).
71. 422 U S . a t 476-77.
72. "The existence or non-existence of the defendant's wealth or financial support is
ON THE
wholly irrelevant when it comes to compensatory damages." D. DOBBS,HANDBOOK
LAWO F REMEDIES
218 (1973); see FED.R. EVID.401, 402.
73. See FED.R. Evln. 403.
74. See, e.g., Bowers v. Carolina Pub. Serv. Co., 148 S.C. 161, 165, 145 S.E. 790, 791
(1928); Marriott v. Williams, 152 Cal. 705, 710, 93 P. 875, 878 (1908).
75. See FED. R. CRIM.P. 32(c); cf. United States v. Dockery, 447 F.2d 1178 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
76. See FED.R. Evrn. 401, 402.
77. See also note 21 supra.
78. 422 U.S. a t 476.
The holding of Munit was limited to its facts: a $10,000 fine imposed on an unincor-
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tion is absent, the relevance of a defendant's wealth seems to
disappear. If it is accepted that the wealth factor is not applicable
to individuals in the jury trial determination, there is no reason
that can justify the use of a different standard for associations
and corporations since they too are constitutionally guaranteed
the right to trial by jury.79 On the other hand, if, as the Court
implied in Muniz, a defendant's wealth is considered in the determination of its right to a trial by jury, there is arguably a violation
of the defendant's right to equal protection under the laws.
2. Equal protection
Under equal protection case law the Court applies a strict
scrutiny test to discriminatory legislation that either is based on
suspect classifications or burdens fundamental rights.Vn the
absence of a compelling state interest, which has rarely been
found by the Court, such legislation is invalidated under the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.Rt
Recent case law has dealt with the question of whether
wealth is a suspect classification. In Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections," the Court stated that "[llines drawn on the basis of
wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfathe Court invalidated the legislation under the
v ~ r e d . "Although
~~
strict scrutiny test since it burdened a fundamental interest-voting-the
Court appears to have been influenced by the
~ n Antonio Independent
use of wealth as a c l a s ~ i f i c a t i o n . ~San
School District v. Rodriguez," however, the Supreme Court did
not treat wealth as a suspect classification since there had been
no discrimination against a definable category of persons resultporated labor union collecting dues from 13,000 members. In rejecting the plea to apply
18 U.S.C. 15 l(3) the Court stated that:
It is not difficult to grasp the proposition that six months in jail is a serious
matter for any individual, but it is not tenable to argue that the possibility of a
$501 fine would be considered a serious risk to a large corporation or labor union.
422 U.S. a t 477. Given the narrow holding of Muniz, there is a possibility that the over
$500 fine standard may still be viable for measuring the seriousness of traditional crimes
(in contrast to criminal contempts).
79. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
80. Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications-A More Modest Role
for Equal Rotection, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV.89.
81. Id. a t 94, 103-04.
82. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
83. Id. a t 668 (citations omitted).
84. Id. a t 670.
85. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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ing in the absolute deprivation of the alleged right.V?he Court
also rejected the claim that since the legislation burdened a fundamental right-public education-the strict scrutiny test
should be applied. According to the Court, the right to a public
education did not qualify as a fundamental right since it was not
protected by the Constitution expressly or by reasonable implication .X7
Using wealth as a factor to determine the right to a jury trial
raises equal protection issues similar to those raised in Harper
and Rodriguez. Concededly, this discrimination is judicial, not
legislative; but this distinction is unimportant for purposes of
appraising the wisdom of the Court's position. This position, were
it legislatively based, would be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
The right to trial by jury is a fundamental right even by the
Rodriguez standard since i t is expressly protected by the
Constitution. Such a fundamental right, when burdened by a
classification based on wealth, as in Harper, is even more certain
to be protected by the equal protection clause. Furthermore, discrimination on the basis of wealth in this setting arguably meets
the Rodriguez requirements for a suspect classification. Whereas
im Rodriguez the class subject to discrimination involved a mixture of poor and non-poor within geographic districts, the judicial
discrimination in Muniz was directed only against those with
greater financial resources. In addition, the plaintiffs in
Rodriguez were not absolutely deprived of the right to a public
education; in Muniz, a wealthy defendant was deprived absolutely of the right to trial by jury. It seems inconsistent for the
Court to burden the fundamental interest of trial by jury by discriminating on the basis of wealth when the Court routinely
strikes down legislation having the same effect.

C. Abandonment of the PettylSerious Distinction
Questions have been raised about the wisdom of limiting the
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment to serious offenses. Justices
Black and Douglas have consistently argued that the plain language of the Sixth Amendment affords the right to trial by jury
.~
the Constito "all" crimes regardless of their s e r i o u s n e ~ sSince
-

86. Id. at 25.
87. Id. at 35.
88. See, e.g., Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 159-60 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 391 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United
States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 724 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting); Green v. United States,
356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
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tution itself does not distinguish between petty and serious offen.~~
ses, they argue, the Court should not create a d i s t i n c t i ~ nThis
proposition is supported by the Seventh Amendment, which
guarantees a trial by jury in suits a t common law where the value
in controversy exceeds $20. It is improbable that the framers
intended litigants to be protected in cases involving such a trifling amount, yet not be protected where the risk is imprisonment
or a fine much greater than $2O?
A similar position has been adopted in a t least two states.
California, for instance, constitutionally guarantees a jury trial
for any person charged with a public offense.g1Similarly, the
Supreme Court of Alaska interpreted the Alaska Constitution,
the relevant language of which is virtually identical to the Sixth
Amendment,92as extending the right to a jury trial to all criminal
defendants who wish one.g3The court indicated that there is no
good reason to draw a line between petty and serious offenses. It
rejected policy arguments based on overburdening the judicial
system as inapplicable when discussing the extent of constitutional protections, and rejected the common law history as stifling "a progressive development of our legal institution^."^^ The
wisdom of rejecting the petty/serious dichotomy is suggested by
these and other arguments made by Justices Black and D o u g l a ~ . ~ ~
In the alternative, Justice Douglas has argued that all criminal contempts should be treated as serious given the serious nature of some criminal contempts and the severe fines imposed on
~thers.~"ccording to Justice Douglas, any offense that carries
with it the social stigma of being a crime merits a jury;g7he points
89. In place of the common law pettyherious distinction, Justices Black and Douglas
proposed a violation/crime test. According to this proposal, criminal defendants would
have a right to trial by jury whereas those charged with a mere violation, like a traffic
violation which carries with it no criminal stigma, would not. See Baldwin v. New York,
399 1J.S. 66, 76 & n.2 (1970); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 390-1 (1966).
90. See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 633-34 (1937) (McReynolds
81 Butler, ?Jd., dissenting).
91. CAI..CONST.art. I, 5 7.
92. AI.AS. CONST.art. I, 4 11 provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of twelve except that the legislature may
provide for a jury of not more than twelve nor less than six in courts not of
record.
93. Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970).
94. Id. at 396.
95. See notes 53, 88 supra.
96. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 384-86 & nn.2-3 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
97. See note 89 supra.
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out that criminal contemnors are treated for all intents and purposes as ordinary criminals. Furthermore, the maximum potential sentence, not the sentence actually imposed, should be the
relevent factor in determining how society looks at an offense.
Although no maximum sentence is imposed by law in cases of
criminal contempt, it is clear from the severity of sentences that
can be and have been imposed that society views the offense as
serious.YnJustice Douglas does not deny that some criminal contempts might be petty, but contends that "[ulntil the time when
petty criminal contempts are properly defined and isolated from
other species of contempts . . . punishment for all manner of
criminal contempts can constitutionally be imposed only after a
trial by jury."Yg
Both Justice Douglas' initial and alternative positions lead
to the same result-the extension of the right to trial by jury to
all criminal contempt proceedings. Although this extension eliminates the need to make the petty/serious detemination on a case
by case basis, it also completely divests judges of summary contempt powers that arguably are needed to control the administration of justice.

D. Legislative Solution to the PettylSerious Dichotomy
The ramifications of abandoning the pettylserious distinction, especially with respect to judges' control of the administration of justice, would be significant. The Court has recently suggested t h a t congressional actionloo might solve the dilemma
caused by the conflict between the judiciary's need to maintain
order in the court and the need to determine which criminal
defendants are entitled to a trial by jury.'" Under this legislative
approach, courts would not make subjective determinations on
an ad hoc basis, but could work with an objective standard by
which the offense punishable by fine would be classified as petty
or serious according to whether its maximum penalty exceeded
the legislatively established threshold. Two obstacles must be
98. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 384-86 & nn.2-3 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 393.
100. Some have suggested that the legislature, not the judiciary, should institute
appropriate reforms in this area of the law. See Patterson, Criminal Contempt: A Proposal
for Reform Providing "The Least Possible Power Adequate to the End Proposed," 17
S.D.1,. REV.41, 64 (1972).
101. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968). See also Muniz v. Hoffman, 422
U.S. 454, 476 (1975).
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overcome before this approach becomes viable. First, Congress
must legislate a maximum penalty for criminal contempt.lmSecond, Congress must enact a statute establishing a threshold between petty and serious crimes.'" If Congress were to enact such
legislation, or clearly manifest intent that 18 U.S.C. section l(3)
be used for such purpose,Io4the process by which the right to a
jury trial in federal criminal contempt cases is to be determined
would be clear.
Without basing the petty/serious criteria on constitutional
grounds, however, the Court would still have to decide requests
for a jury trial in criminal contempt cases arising in state courts
on a case by case basis. Although it is true that the right to trial
by jury has been extended to state proceedings by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment, ln%ny federal statute attempting to control the right to trial by jury in state proceedings would likely be
held invalid as a congressional exercise beyond its power.
Given their disadvantages, the solutions considered above
are not entirely satisfactory. One approach not yet fully explored
appears to be the most efficient: the establishment by the Supreme Court of objective criteria with which to make the
pettylserious determination deemed inherent in the Sixth
Amendment. ' " T h i s solution would sufficiently clarify this disconcerting area of the law so as to avoid the case by case analysis
presently required. In addition, the Court would no longer need
to consider the financial circumstances of the contemnor, a consideration that appears to deny equal protection of the laws as
guaranteed by the Constitution. Furthermore, interpreting the
Sixth Amendment right by objective judicial creiteria would
guarantee the right to trial by jury in state, as well as federal,
proceedings by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.ln7
102. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 391 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
103. See generally Kuhns, Limiting the Criminal Contempt Power: New Roles for the
Prowcutor ctnd the Grclnd Jury, 73 M I C H .I,. REV.483, 494 (1975). The author proposes
that all criminal contempts be treated for all purposes as ordinary criminal prosecutions
and indicates needed legislative reforms.
104. In Muniz the majority declared that "criminal contempt, in and of itself without
regard for the punishment imposed, is not a serious offense absent legislative declaration
to the contrary . . . ." 422 U.S. a t 476.
105. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
106. See notes 10-17 and accompanying text supra.
107. See generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).

